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CASE COMMENTS
From the foregoing authorities it would appear that West Vir-
ginia would permit recovery for depreciation as an element of
damages but that such depreciation must be recovered in the
original action rather than in a subsequent proceeding upon the
bond.
George Charles Hughes III
Evidence--Inant's Pleadings as a Judicial Admission
P, an infant, by his next friend, brought an action against his
mother for injuries sustained when he fell out of and under an auto-
mobile being backed out of a driveway by her. The complaint
charged the mother with wilful and wanton negligence and was
later amended to include the automobile manufacturer and auto-
mobile dealer as defendants, charging them with negligence as
manufacturer and seller of an automobile with a defective door,
alleging that the door came open and caused P to fall from the
vehicle. D-manufacturer and D-seller contended that P had made
a judicial admission as to their non-liability by charging his mother
with wilful and wanton negligence. The trial court entered a judg-
ment on the verdict for all defendants. Held, reversed. An infant
cannot be bound by the admissions of others. The pleadings made
on behalf of an infant cannot be regarded as judicial admissions
against him and the infant is not bound thereby. Anderson v.
Anderson, 187 N.E.2d 746 (Ill. App. 1963).
It appears to be the undisputed rule that admissions made by
guardians ad litem are not binding upon their infant wards. This
rule applies to admissions made by guardians ad litem or next
friend whether as parties complainant or as parties defendant. The
reason for the rule is the protection of persons of tender years who
are unable to look out for their own interests. The rule requires the
opponent of the infant to prove all of his claims by his own evidence.
White v. Joyce, 158 U.S. 128 (1894); Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134
U.S. 650 (1889); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 87 (1921).
The West Virginia authority on this point is in accord. It was
held in Childers v. Milam, 68 W. Va. 503, 70 S.E. 118 (1911), that
the admissions in the answers of adult defendants cannot bind infant
defendants in the cause. A decree against the rights of infants
standing only on the admissions must be reversed.
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Glade Mining Co. v. Harris, 65 W. Va. 152, 63 S.E. 873 (1909),
held that an answer of an infant can not be read against him, and
that an infant is never to be prejudiced by an act, default, or admis-
sion of a guardian ad litem.
In Stolte v. Larkin, 110 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1940), it was held
that in an action brought by the guardian of a minor against
motorists, for injuries sustained by the minor, the complaint which
contained admissions against the interest of the minor was not ad-
missible against him as a judicial admission. The court further
noted that the weight of authority favors the rule that a guardian
of a minor cannot make admissions affecting substantial rights of the
minor so as to bind the latter; and this rule applies to admissions in
pleadings where the minor is either a plaintiff or a defendant. In
support of its conclusion in the Stolte case, the court cited Childers v.
Milam, supra; Glade Mining Co. v. Harris, supra; and Holderby v.
Hagan, 54 W. Va. 341, 50 S.E. 437 (1905).
The West Virginia law on the point in issue was decided at an
early date and appears not to have been altered since. In Laidley
v. Kline, 8 W. Va. 218 (1875), while ruling in accord with the above
authority, the decision noted that a court failed to discharge its duty
when it did not carefully guard the interests of infants against wrong
and injustice. Accord, Calhoun County Bank v. Ellison, 133 W. Va.
9, 54 S.E.2d 182 (1949).
In the principal case the court noted that the pleading of an
infant cannot be his product in the sense that he had anything to
do with it, so the rule that the pleading of a party may be used as a
judicial admission against him could not apply to an infant. The
court based its reasoning on the fact that a two-year old could
not possible answer questions and relate facts necessary to aid his
counsel in preparing the case for trial. This argument seems to
progressively lose merit as the age of an infant litigant advances. If
an infant is presumed to be a competent witness upon reaching the
age of fourteen years, another infant of similiar maturity and mental
development would certainly be of some assistance in preparing a
case for trial. It would appear that the rule in the principal case
should be more rigidly enforced in favor of an infant defendant than
to benefit an infant plaintiff whose counsel was less than adequate.
The West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure would not affect
the previous holding of the West Virginia Supreme Court on this
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point. The Rules do not alter or change substantive law. See Rule
17(c) relative to guardians ad litem.
A final point of interest in this area was noted in Glade Mining
Co. v. Harris, supra. There the court, in deciding a question of first
impression for West Virginia, held that where a record shows error
as to a minor defendant, the judgment will be reversed, even though
there was no appeal on the part of the minor. This is demanded of
the court, it being the duty of the court, as the guardian of infants,
to protect their rights.
Ralph Charles Dusic, Jr.
Insurance-Waiver and Estoppel as Satisfying Condition of
Proof of Loss in Fire Insurance Policies
Ps, husband and wife, brought an action to recover against Ds,
two fire insurance companies, upon one policy insuring Ps' dwelling
and another policy insuring their household property. Both policies
required, as a condition precedent to recovery, a proof of loss,
signed and sworn to by the insured. The trial court entered judg-
ment for Ps. Held, affirmed as to the dwelling insurance as Ps
"substantially" complied with the proof of loss requirement by sub-
mitting to an examination under oath by the insurer's counsel. Re-
versed in the case of the household property policy. The court found
as a matter of law that a list of household property lost in the fire,
improperly valued at cost, and mailed to the adjuster was not a
"proof of loss" notwithstanding: (1) Ps were "ignorant and illiter-
ate"; (2) Ps lost their policies in the fire which policies were re-
placed by the solicitor with memoranda showing issuance of the
policies but not mentioning the conditions precedent to D's recovery;
(3) Ps were not apprised of the requirement to submit proofs of loss
-on the contrary, both the solicitor and the adjuster alledgedly told
Ps that it would not be necessary to file any papers other than the
list of household property and the values thereof which should be,
and was, mailed in an envelope provided by the adjuster. Nor were
the words and acts of D's agents sufficient to bind D by waiver and
estoppel as D's agents did not have such authority. Maynard v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 129 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1963).
The result of the finding in the personal property policy case
appears to be harsh. The court refused the jury finding that the
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